Country/entity	Indonesia Aceh
Region	Asia and Pacific
Agreement name	Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence
Date	4 Apr 2001
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes
Agreement/conflict level	Intrastate/intrastate conflict

Indonesian Conflicts (1976 -)

Aceh Conflict (1976 -)
After a decade of increasing grievances against the centralist tendencies of the Suharto-government, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) started a military campaign in 1976 for the independence of the province in the far northeast of the Indonesian archipelago. After near defeat in 1979, GAM regained strength with Libyan support and the heaviest fighting occurred during the late 1980s when the Indonesian military intensified its violent counter-insurgency policies. The devastating tsunami in December 2004 effectively destroyed Aceh's infrastructure and severely reduced the operational capabilities of GAM. This weakening led to a signed peace agreement in August 2005, facilitated by the Finish NGO CMI Peace Negotiations.

Indonesia-Moluccas Conflict (1999-2002)
The fall of Suharto in 1997 sparked off a number of conflicts across Indonesia. In the Moluccas region, the administrative division was divided into Moluccas and North Moluccas, thereby exacerbating a conflict characterised by communal and sectarian divisions. In part these divisions were a result of an official government transmigration programme running from late 1960s onwards that spurred conflict over resources, including land. Faith-based militias were generally responsible for the fighting from 1999 until 2002, including Laskar Jihad, and human rights abuses were committed by both sides. Opportunistic crime was also responsible for of the violence. The military campaign by Lashkar Islam was aimed to displacing Christian residents. One such event was the expulsion of the Christian residents of the Banda Islands in April 1999. The conflict ended with the signing of the Malino II Accord on 13 February 2002.
Close
Indonesian Conflicts (1976 -
)

Stage	Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature	Government/territory
Peace process	Indonesia-Aceh peace process

Parties	Republic of Indonesia JSCM, KB. Pol. Drs. Ridhwan Karim, GAM-JSCM, Tgk. Nashiruddin bin Ahmed
Third parties	Witnessed by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Description	-

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Groups

Children/youth	No specific mention.
Disabled persons	No specific mention.
Elderly/age	No specific mention.
Migrant workers	No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/ national group	No specific mention.
Religious groups	No specific mention.
Indigenous people	No specific mention.
Other groups	No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons	No specific mention.
Social class	No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender	No specific mention.
Men and boys	No specific mention.
LGBTI	No specific mention.
Family	No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general)	No specific mention.
State configuration	No specific mention.
Self determination	No specific mention.
Referendum	No specific mention.
State symbols	No specific mention.
Independence/ secession	No specific mention.
Accession/ unification	No specific mention.
Border delimitation	No specific mention.
Cross-border provision	No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed)	No specific mention.
Elections	No specific mention.

Electoral commission	No specific mention.
Political parties reform	No specific mention.
Civil society	Page 1, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows: a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels. b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.
Traditional/ religious leaders	No specific mention.
Public administration	No specific mention.
Constitution	No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing	No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing	No specific mention.
Economic power sharing	No specific mention.
Military power sharing	No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general	No specific mention.
Bill of rights/similar	No specific mention.
Treaty incorporation	No specific mention.
Civil and political rights	No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights	No specific mention.

Rights related issues

Citizenship	No specific mention.
Democracy	No specific mention.
Detention procedures	No specific mention.
Media and communication	No specific mention.
Mobility/access	No specific mention.
Protection measures	No specific mention.
Other	No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI	No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions	No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law	No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions	No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts	No specific mention.
Prisons and detention	No specific mention.
Traditional Laws	No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction	No specific mention.
National economic plan	No specific mention.
Natural resources	No specific mention.
International funds	No specific mention.
Business	No specific mention.
Taxation	No specific mention.
Banks	No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights	No specific mention.
Pastoralist/ nomadism rights	No specific mention.
Cultural heritage	No specific mention.
Environment	No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access	No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees	No specific mention.
Ceasefire	Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision [Summary] Both sides evaluated the Cessation of Hostilities signed February 2001, and the implementation of the 13-day Peace Zone. Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives: 1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence. Page 2, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows: a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels. b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff. c) All agreements to be socialized to the public. Page 2, c. Since both sides' opinions are very different, the Peace Zone pilot project in North Aceh and Bireuen is not to be continued .
Police	Page 2, 4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
Armed forces	Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives: 1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence. Page 2, 4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
DDR	No specific mention.
Intelligence services	No specific mention.

Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces	Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives: 1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence. 2) Considering the facts above, it is not reasonable to maintain or to prolong the Peace Zone because GAM did not obey the agreement. Page 2, 2. b 1) Even though the violence throughout the Peace Zone could not be decreased as expected, and after considering public opinion, GAM recommends that the Peace Zone should be prolonged with improved mechanism as follows: Page 2, 4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
Withdrawal of foreign forces	No specific mention.
Corruption	No specific mention.
Crime/organised crime	No specific mention.
Drugs	No specific mention.
Terrorism	No specific mention.

Transitional justice	
Transitional justice general	No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon	No specific mention.
Courts	No specific mention.
Mechanism	No specific mention.
Prisoner release	No specific mention.
Vetting	No specific mention.

Victims	No specific mention.
Missing persons	No specific mention.
Reparations	No specific mention.
Reconciliation	No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory	No specific mention.
Other international signatory	No specific mention.
Referendum for agreement	No specific mention.
International mission/force/ similar	No specific mention.
Enforcement mechanism	No specific mention.
