

<b>Country/entity</b>	Yemen
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Agreement between al-‘Awlaqī Tribe and al-Qaeda
<b>Date</b>	2 May 2014
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	al-‘Awlaqī Tribe: Sheikh Abū Bakr Farīd al-‘Awlaqī, Chief of the al-Ṣa‘īd District, ‘Alī Bin Hammad al-‘Awāliq  al-Qaeda: Ahmad ‘Āṭif al-‘Āṭiqī, al-Habashī al-Bārās [al-‘Awlaqī], Sāliḥ bin Bil‘aīd al-Sālimī.
<b>Third parties</b>	-
<b>Description</b>	An agreement between the ‘Alī Bin Hammad al-‘Awāliq and al-Qaeda, aimed at preventing violence in the areas inhabited by the al-Awlaki Tribe. Sets out provisions aimed at restricting assembly, giving safe harbour and preventing hostile acts between the two groups.

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<b>Agreement document</b>	<a href="#">YE_140502_al-Awlaqi Tribes and al-Qaeda agreement_EN.pdf (opens in new tab)</a>   <a href="#">Download PDF</a>
<b>Agreement document (original language)</b>	<a href="#">YE_140502_al-Awlaqi Tribes and al-Qaeda agreement_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)</a>

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### Local agreement properties

<b>Process type</b>	Informal but persistent process
<b>Rationale</b>	The agreement displays the local practice of prominent societal figures or religious figures (in this case a Sheikh) calling or inviting parties to discussions and meetings aimed at reaching an agreement. Persistent practice or a culture of signing local agreements also appears to exist between other tribes and al Qaeda at this time. A number of other tribes affected by the same issues outlined in this agreement were reported to be making clear statements of intent at the same time, across multiple districts in two governorates, Shabwah (province in this agreement) and Abyan. The author of the reference refers to 'agreements' between a number of tribes and al Qaeda taking place.
<b>Is there a documented link to a national peace process?</b>	T

<b>Link to national process: articulated rationale</b>	The text outlines the proposal for the agreement and minutes of the meeting to be handed to a government body in the governorate. As distinct government figures, the body includes Minister of Defence and the Chairman of the National Security Service. With this said, there is no explicit details in the agreement set out for how this body will support the agreement.
<b>Name of Locale</b>	al-Ṣa‘īd district, Shabwah governorate (coordinates for Ataq city - see justify or query)
<b>Nature of Locale</b>	Region
<b>GPS Lat/Long (DD)</b>	14.530176, 46.829856
<b>Participant type</b>	Local armed group Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder
<b>Mediator, facilitator or similar</b>	Mediator or similar referred to
<b>Mediator (references)</b>	The text describes Sheikh the chief of the al-Ṣa‘īd District, Abū Bakr Farīd al-‘Awlaqī as inviting parties to the agreement and people from the area in question to the agreement meeting.
<b>Type of mediator/facilitator/similar</b>	

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## Local issues

### Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)

No specific mention.

### Grievance List

Page 1, 1. It is strictly forbidden to assemble al-Qaeda in al-Ṣa‘īd [District] and Wādī Yashbim at all.

Page 1, 2. It is strictly forbidden to undertake military actions in al-Ṣa‘īd District, in her valleys or on her people.

Page 1, 3. It is strictly forbidden for individuals from the tribes of ‘Alī Bin Hammad al-‘Awāliq belonging to al-Qaeda to harbour any foreigner in the al-Ṣa‘īd District.

Page 1, 4. As long as members of al-Qaeda belong to the tribes of ‘Alī Bin Hammad al-‘Awāliq in al-Ṣa‘īd District they will stay in their homes and not commit hostile acts against anyone, unless they are subject to such acts. If they are assaulted in the safety of their homes in al-Ṣa‘īd they will be perceived as individuals from the tribes of ‘Alī Bin Hammad al-‘Awāliq before they are considered members of the al-Qaeda Organisation.

### Cattle rustling/ banditry

No specific mention.

### Social cover

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