

<b>Country/entity</b>	Yemen
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Ta'iz Ceasefire Agreement
<b>Date</b>	16 Apr 2016
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Government/territory
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen peace process
<b>Parties</b>	Islah MP/NDC Member, Abdulkareem Shaiban Southern Group NDC Member, Ali Mohammed Ahmed Al Ma'amari Chairman of the of the De-escalation and Ceasefire Committee, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Nayef Republican Guard, Brigadier Zakaria Al Muta'a
<b>Third parties</b>	United Nations, GCC
<b>Description</b>	A Second ceasefire agreement drafted for the city of Ta'iz following the exclusion of key militias in the nationwide ceasefire agreements signed at Dharan al-Janoub 6 days earlier. Commits to opening the roads from Ta'iz and communication between the two sides to avoid violations.

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**Agreement document** [YE\\_160416\\_Taiz Ceasefire Agreement.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_160416\\_Taiz Ceasefire Agreement\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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### Local agreement properties

<b>Process type</b>	Formal structured process
<b>Rationale</b>	There is formality described in the text as committees are to be formed by the parties involved, in order to ensure enforcement. There is also a provision set out for the governorate committee to support the effort as a backstop arrangement. This agreement is connected to a push from the national level process to implement a number of ceasefire agreements in multiple provinces. This agreement in part reflects a level of universal acceptance among a range of local actors, as it attempts to address the omission of fighting groups from the original national agreement and include all locally influential fighting groups. Persistent practice can be seen based on this effort and on the comprehensive involvement of actors in these agreements around this time; southern secessionist, religious militias, government forces and the Houthis all appear to be engaged throughout 2016.
<b>Is there a documented link to a national peace process?</b>	Yes

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** Firstly while there is no specific mention in the agreement text, the reference to the national agreement is explaining why this agreement is being carried out to support the national process. There is also a precedent to justify a link on the basis that there is involvement of local actors among the signing parties, with a clear stance towards the wider conflict - primarily the southern groups signing. Further for all of these local ceasefire agreements in the sub-set, there is a provision in the national text which outlines the implementation of a De-escalation and Coordination Committee, which would consist of military and official government individuals with the aim of coordinating with local committees to encourage implementation. It is possible that this presence is always involved across these agreements, whilst not always explicitly mentioned in the text. They will not be coded here as a type of mediator / facilitator as in each case it is not always clear if they have been involved, as the national document plans. This agreement emanates from an initial national level agreement which lays out ceasefire provisions for a number of provinces. There is formal reference in the text which denotes the meeting for this agreement upholding the arrangements and values set out in the national level agreement. The United Nations is also a third party. Additionally, many of the ceasefire agreements at this time focus on the opening up of roads in regard to humanitarian access, and this tends to be an inherent part of the national process. Ta'iz is a focal point of this effort and the text describes provisions for the main roads to Sana'a and Hudaydah being secured and reopened. This issue has tended to be an ongoing focus of agreements at the national level, with much discussion ongoing in UN led talks, around how to ensure main highway access between Ta'iz and other key cities. In relation to national focuses of ensuring Ta'iz becomes a safer space (as it has absorbed a substantial amount of the fall out from the conflict) this agreement also reflects the need to involve all local actors in this type of agreement and part of ensuring Ta'iz is truly in keeping with the aims of the national process, is recognising that Ta'iz is densely populated with so many of Yemen's warring factions and parties. They all have a presence in Ta'iz.

**Name of Locale** Ta'iz governorate

**Nature of Locale** Region

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 13.577494, 44.017906

**Participant type** Local state actor  
Local armed group  
Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** No mention of mediator or similar

**Local issues**

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)**      Page 1, Untitled preamble, In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful

**Grievance List**      [Summary] (1) demilitarisation of armed presences in the areas addressed by the agreement (2) the securing and opening of roads and checkpoints in a timely manner to ensure arrival of key supplies to the people

**Cattle rustling/ banditry**      No specific mention.

**Social cover**      No specific mention.

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