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| **Country/entity** | Syria |
| **Region** | Middle East and North Africa |
| **Agreement name** | Ceasefire by Jaysh al-Islam |
| **Date** | 2 May 2016 |
| **Agreement status** | Multiparty signed/agreed |
| **Interim arrangement** | Yes |
| **Agreement/conflict level** | Intrastate/local conflict |

**Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - )**

The agreements relate to three different conflict contexts. Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a key factor for the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, with Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army units intervened in 1976 against the Palestinian/Leftist militias. Following a massacre at Tel al-Zaatar that year, Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire at a meeting of the Arab League. However, the Arab League also mandated an Arab Deterrence Force, consisting of mostly Syrian soldiers with token contributions from other Arab League states, thus further legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During a second bout of fighting that began in 1989, caused by the formation of rival Lebanese regimes in East and West Beirut, the Syrian-backed regime won and in 1991 the 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination' was signed to legalize the Syrian occupation as a means to ensure the security of Syria. Syrian forces were forced to withdraw in 2005 following possible involvement in the assassination of Lebanon's President Hariri.

Syria-internal. In 2011, domestic upheaval following a wave of protests across the Arab World soon led to violent repression of protestors by Syrian government troops. The violence progressed steadily and by July 2011 the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed consisting of defected military units and new recruits. The FSA and rebel umbrella group known as the Syrian National Council represented the first attempt at coordinating rebel factions in late 2011. However, a steady influx of foreign fighters and increased sectarianism radicalised opposition groups, which relied on foreign funding. The nature of the conflict changed drastically in late 2013 as infighting among the opposition groups increased. One of the more significant developments was the split between the al-Qaeda outfits the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2014 in addition to the intensified targeting of other rebel factions by ISIS fighters in particular, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the FSA and other jihadist outfits. Since the summer of 2014, the conflict was further internationalized when ISIS announced the formation of an Islamic state eroding the state line between Iraq and Syria and also in mid-2015 when Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.

Close

Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - )

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| **Stage** | Ceasefire/related |
| **Conflict nature** | Inter-group |
| **Peace process** | Syrian Local Agreements |
| **Parties** | Faylaq al-Rahman;<br>Jaysh al-Islam;<br>Jabhat al-Nusra; |
| **Third parties** | - |
| **Description** | Short ruling by the Syrian Islamic Council announced by Jaysh al-Islam on behalf of the people of Ghouta, Damascus. Ruling provides for the opening of roads; development of food; a return of factions to their previous territorial holdings and a return of possessions; release of prisoners; a committee will be formed to investigate bloodshed and transfer possessions. |

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| **Agreement document** | SY_160502_Ceasefire by Jaysh al-Islam_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) \| Download PDF |
| **Agreement document (original language)** | SY_160502_Ceasefire by Jaysh al-Islam_AR.pdf (opens in new tab) |

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**Local agreement properties**

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| **Process type** | Isolated example |
| **Rationale** | -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; no culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups have a Salafist ideology; they oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Although tensions existed between the fighting groups since March 2016, and one agreement had been signed by Haysh al-Islam in the same locale on 19 July 2015, it seems complicated to refer to a culture of signing agreements and to a will to establish a peace process. |
| **Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** | No |
| **Link to national process: articulated rationale** | No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. |

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| **Name of Locale** | East Ghouta |
| **Nature of Locale** | Region |
| **GPS Lat/Long (DD)** | 33.535720, 36.348073 |
| **Participant type** | Local armed group |
| **Mediator, facilitator or similar** | No mention of mediator or similar |

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**Local issues**

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)**

Page 1, In the Name of Allah the Merciful

Page 2, Inform the Assad gangs and their allies, that we are capable – Allah willing – to solve our differences and gather our ranks in order to answer to their aggression and overthrow them.

Page 2, Allah be behind our intention

**Grievance List**

Page 1,
A response to the will and initiative of the people of East Ghouta which was put forward on Friday 29/4/2016, and in our concern for the right of bloodshed and the redirecting of rifles in the right direction. We have therefore announced to them our consent to this ceasefire initiative.
The response of the Legion at the time to the initiative of the people was of indignity and disrespect, by a bloodshed. They were also dedicated to dividing Ghouta and confirmed their hate, as the Leader of Faylaq al-Rahman [The al-Rahman Legion] said: “There is always a lot in Jaysh al-Islam, and we will not accept anything else but the status of al-Rahman, we prove it as it is, because we are against the departure of just some civilians”.
Thereafter, the concerned committee made an initiative by making adjustments to the initiative. They provided it to us and we agreed to it again. Jaysh al-Islam do indeed show our people in East Ghouta, and in Syria in general, that Jaysh al-Islam immediately responded to the initiative of the Syrian Islamic Council. It released a statement with the number 6/2016 on 23 Regep 1437, corresponding to 30 April 2016, but we did not hear a response from the other part, except from the answer of a gun in the appearance of Mujahideen and their retreat from the fronts. They cut off the supply routes. They were just absorbed in their aggression and military determination and on their siege of the Mujahideen and their families in cooperation with their allies Jaysh al-Fustat [The Army of Fustat] in addition to Qins al-Muwatineen [The Snipers of the Citizens], without respecting the sacredness of blood.
Meanwhile, the brothers in Faylaq al-Rahman announced their preparation for a ceasefire, as this announcement ignored the position of Jabhat al-Nusra [The Nusra Front] and undermined the nation of the two halves in hate. It did not specify details of the solution. Afterwards, factions of the Legion raided the area of al-‘Ab at dawn! Thus, our legal and revolutionary responsibility pledges us to again confirm our agreement to the ceasefire initiative introduced by the people of Ghouta, which listed the following:

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| **Cattle rustling/ banditry** | No specific mention. |
| **Social cover** | No specific mention. |

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