

Country/entity	Yemen
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Agreement to Cease Fire between the Tihami Movement in Harah al-Yamin and Ansar Allah
Date	24 Oct 2014
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

Stage	Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties	<p>On behalf of the Tihama Movement (Harāh al-Yamin):</p> <p>Mamduḥ Muhammad ‘Issa²⁹</p> <p>Zayla’i ṭ Muhammad ‘Aysh²⁸</p> <p>Aḥmad Muhammad Aḥmad Jamaḥ ṭ Muhammad ‘Aysh Hassan</p> <p>Shahab Muhammad al-‘Adiḥ Hassan Haḍi²⁸</p> <p>Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rizaḡ</p> <p>On behalf of Ansar Allah:</p> <p>Aḡu ṭ Taha</p>
Third parties	-
Description	Short agreement between the Tihami Movement in Harah al-Yamin, Hudaydah, and Ansar Allah.
Agreement document	YE_141024_Agreement to Cease Fire between the Tihami Movement in Harah al-Yamin and Ansar Allah_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) Download PDF
Agreement document (original language)	YE_141024_Agreement to Cease Fire between the Tihami Movement in Harah al-Yemen and Ansar Allah_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)

Local agreement properties

Process type Informal but persistent process

Rationale This agreement, whilst fairly ambiguous in regard to the provisions set out, appears to broadly fit with a practice of local signing at this time in the conflict. There seems to be a pattern at this time whereby groups that had originally taken a strong anti-Ansar Allah stance, are signing agreements of co-existence with the Houthis in order to preserve their local areas based on the recognition of public needs. There is also a clear culture involving signing and implementation being led by key societal figures or notables and the parties involved; often the societal figures involved are directly affiliated to the parties or interests of the agreement. The responsibility for a resolution, implementation and monitoring generally rests with the parties themselves. Generally, there does not tend to be an external influence in these examples. It is also a highly localised agreement, specific to a conflict incident in the city and the agreement explicitly addresses a very specific area. It appears implicit that the Tihami movement are not agreeing to fully cede control of the area to the Houthis. There is clear reference to working together with Ansar Allah and importantly the history of the Tihami. They had up until this agreement held a strong presence in the area, controlling a number of strategically important buildings around the hotel (which is the location of the conflict incident referenced in the agreement), including the castle in Hudaydah.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process? T

Link to national process: articulated rationale The wider peace process is not specifically mentioned in the text. There is also no further research which indicates a clear structural link to the national peace process.

Name of Locale Hārah al-Yamin neighbourhood, Hudaydah city

Nature of Locale Smaller

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 14.790500, 42.943162

Participant type Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) No specific mention.

Grievance List Page 1, Paragraph 1: a misunderstanding that resulted in martyrs and several wounded on both sides after armed groups arrived in front of the hotel. We all desire to turn a new page to heal the wounds. We are all brothers and we commit to not repeat the misunderstanding between us and Ansar Allah

Page 1, Paragraph 2: We ask Ansar Allah to cooperate with use in securing the area for the sake of public and private interest. The sons of Tihamah have long suffered and been deprived stand together in a way that leads all people to dignity

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.
