

<b>Country/entity</b>	Yemen
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Agreement between Ansar Allah and the al-Shilali Tribe in al-Ridmah, Ibb
<b>Date</b>	15 Jul 2014
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	Zayd Mohammed bin Yahya al-Dhari [On behalf of Ansar Allah] Sheikh Abd al-Wahid Hizam al-Shilali al-Du'am [On behalf of al-Shilali Tribes]
<b>Third parties</b>	Sheikh Ahmed Salah al-Muqbali [Mediator]
<b>Description</b>	Agreement on an end to hostilities between the al-Shilali Tribes and Ansar Allah in al-Ridmah, and enforcement mechanism of payments, made to start 'this Muharram' (which is the beginning of the first month in the new calendar, which has been given as the date).

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**Agreement document** [YE\\_140715\\_Agreement between Ansar Allah and the al-Shilali Tribe in Ibb\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_140715\\_Peace Agreement between Houthis and Tribal Militias in Ibb\\_AR.pdf.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Formal structured process

**Rationale** The locally accepted practice of sheikhs and societal notables calling parties to an agreement is present. There is nuance to this regarding the level of religious involvement, in that that sheikhs and notables from al-Ridmah are calling on representatives, one of which is also a sheikh. This adds a dual-level of religious commitment. There also appears to be a substantive presence of tribal values and process type to this agreement, as it appears implicit that one of the tribes of the area involved in fighting is affiliated with Ansar Allah (Houthis). While the Houthis are named as one of the parties, it appears implicit in the text that this agreement is fundamentally about tribal dynamics in the area and by extension the wider tribal network in the area will ensure the agreement is implemented. The duration of reconciliation is also set out in the text as six months, this longer term type of process being ascribed to an agreement appears to be a common tribal practice around this time. There is also reference to a previous agreement/reconciliation which might add to the procedural support involved in this agreement. Further, the text outlines a fines based enforcement mechanism supporting the agreement which is recognised by the tribes in the area.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** T

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** The wider peace process is not specifically mentioned in the text. There is also no further research which indicates a clear structural link to the national peace process. The state is mentioned in the text as one of the bodies that a party violating the agreement will be accountable to. It is not explicit exactly how the state will implement this or directly support the agreement however. The text does state that 'the government ratifies it', this comes after an illegible section of translation however.

**Name of Locale** al-Radmah district, Ibb governorate

**Nature of Locale** Region

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 14.227527, 44.585525

**Participant type** Local armed group

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to

**Mediator (references)** Sheikh Ahmed Salah al-Muqbali

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar**

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#### Local issues

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** Page 1, In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate  
Page 1, This is what has been agreed. May God be pleased with this.

**Grievance List** [Summary] The existence of conflict generally in the area and the need for all public and private infrastructures to be secure; bringing in or harbouring anyone prohibited into the district.

**Cattle rustling/ banditry** No specific mention.

**Social cover** Page 1, Paragraph 1, ... It also prohibits both sides from using, bringing, harbouring or accepting anybody who [illegible] the District.

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