

<b>Country/entity</b>	Yemen
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	al-Qa'alah and Shubayqa Reconciliation Agreement
<b>Date</b>	2 Aug 2014
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	al-Qaalah and Shubayqa [9 signatories, including finger prints]
<b>Third parties</b>	Al-Sayyid Ahmed Bihay al-Din Salih al-Sarwari
<b>Description</b>	Agreement between the al-Qaalah and Shubayqa tribes in Yemen, mediated by a local sayyid [descendant of the prophet Muhammad]. Agreement provides for a three year truce from the day of signature. Details of agreement are missing due to translation and illegibility of original document. Please refer to original.

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**Agreement document** [YE\\_140829\\_Al-Qa'alah and Shubayqa\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_140829\\_Al-Qa'alah and Shubayqa\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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#### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Formal structured process

**Rationale** As part of a process involving the other agreement between the al-Qa'alah and al-Aghbarah tribes, this agreement appears to mostly involve a similar practice. While there are some translation issues, elders of the tribes involved appear to be responsible for implementation, in regard to violation, and are present at the signing. Similarly to the other agreement, this is part of the typical local practice where signing parties themselves lead and shape agreements, based on a tradition of self governance and mutual understandings of confidence building measures. This agreement also reflects a locally accepted signing practice in the sense that it is part of a long term agreement set out between the two tribes, and in this sense is part of an ongoing process which may involve later revisions or other truces/agreements. This agreement is to last three years.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?**

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**Link to national process: articulated rationale** The wider peace process is not specifically mentioned in the text. There is also no further research which indicates a clear structural link to the national peace process.

**Name of Locale** Sabiha (al-Subaiha/Shuaibi), area within the governorate of Lahij

<b>Nature of Locale</b>	Region
<b>GPS Lat/Long (DD)</b>	13.068251, 44.913642
<b>Participant type</b>	Local armed group
<b>Mediator, facilitator or similar</b>	Mediator or similar referred to
<b>Mediator (references)</b>	In this agreement there is specific reference to the role of the Sayyid, which is an Arabic title of honour/respect given to people who are culturally accepted as descendants of the prophet Muhammad. It seems implicit in the wording of this agreement that the local Sayyid was mediating or over seeing the agreement/signing. Al-Sayyid Ahmed Bihay al-Din Salih al-Sarwari (Sorouri) is described in the document text and the source attached to it as endeavouring to ensure the agreement.
<b>Type of mediator/facilitator/similar</b>	
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<b>Local issues</b>	
<b>Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)</b>	<p>Page 1, In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate</p> <p>Page 1, Praise be to God, and May His Peace and Blessings be upon the Messenger Mohammed bin Abdullah and upon his family and companions.</p> <p>Allah says: ‘And say [unto them, O Prophet]: "Act! -and then He will make you understand what you have been doing.” [9:105]</p>
<b>Grievance List</b>	[Summary] (1) need for atonement between the two tribes (2) conditions which support a cease fire (3) an increase of ensured security (4) a need for the two tribes to be able to operate broadly as neighbours
<b>Cattle rustling/ banditry</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Social cover</b>	No specific mention.
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