

Country/entity	Yemen
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Minutes of Agreement - Ta'iz
Date	27 Apr 2018
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

Stage	Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties	committee tasked by the Governor: Muhammad Najib: Signature: [signed] Ridhwan al-Hashidi: Signature: [signed] ‘Abduh Qassim al-Jar’i: Signature: [signed] Colonel Abd al-‘Aziz al-Majidi: Signature: [signed]
Third parties	-
Description	An 8-point agreement to solve internal disputes (and establish a ceasefire) between the Brigades of Abu Abbas and other pro-Hadi forces in the city of Taiz. Includes (1) a guarantee for the treatment of injured and compensation for martyrs; (2) a ceasefire; (3) the formation of a joint committee and arrest of wanted individuals; (4) handover of buildings; (5) withdrawal of Abu Abbas Brigades to front line; (6) prisoner release and (7) a ceasefire monitoring commission.

Agreement document [YE_180427_Minutes of Agreement - Taiz_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [YE_180427_Minutes of Agreement - Taiz.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type	Formal structured process
Rationale	This appears to be formalised to an extent, by the organisation of a committee being set up and run by the local Governor and local security officials. There are provisions for a committee formed by the local Governor to ensure hand over of prisoners, government buildings and another body to support and monitor the ceasefire. It could be argued that there is a persistent practice of signing similar agreements, with other national agreements involving conflict in Taiz being signed, one of which has also involved religious groups and southern groups - who make up a prominent element of fighting groups in Taiz. Taiz has tended to be a central point of conflict in the country - with high numbers of civilian casualties, ceasefire agreements in this area are common. This leads to an irrefutable link to the wider national process (outlined in box below).
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?	Yes

Link to national process: articulated rationale Ceasefire provisions are mentioned specifically as an issue in this agreement text. The provisions also outline the handover of government buildings which speak more broadly to the power struggle in Taiz and control of security. Brigades outlined in the agreement represent two opposing religious warring factions, a Salafist group (35th Brigade) and an Islah affiliated group (22nd Brigade). Attempting to clear these groups out of Taiz is arguably part of a hope for pro Hadi forces to control security in Taiz and this arguably feeds into the other national ceasefire processes between the Government and the Houthis as a security imperative.

Name of Locale Taiz governorate

Nature of Locale Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 13.580576, 44.018446

Participant type Local state actor

Mediator, facilitator or similar Mediator or similar referred to

Mediator (references) The Mediator can be considered to be the Governor of Taiz, Amin Mahmoud as the committee discussion and signing, as well as the physical hand over of official buildings are thought to have been convened and overseen by him respectively. The handover itself was implemented and supervised by the committee.

Type of mediator/facilitator/similar Regional state actor

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, Untitled preamble, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Grievance List No specific mention.

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover Page 1, 3. Implementing the directives of the Governor to form a joint force based on the directions issued by him to the Deputy Governor for Defense and Security Affairs to arrest wanted individuals
