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Country/entity Yemen

Region Middle East and North Africa

Agreement name Agreement between the Bani Maudhah, Bani al-Shurayfi and Bani Rassam in Utmah,

Dhamar

Date 20 Jan 2014

Agreement status Multiparty signed/agreed

Interim Yes

arrangement

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, coasefire attempts continuously failed. A two w

Stage Ceasefire/related

Conflict nature Inter-group

Peace process Yemen Inter-group Agreements

Parties Page 1, ... agreement was reached between the brothers whose names and signatures are

listed below, each one of them representing themselves, their side, the families of the victims, and the sheikhs, prominent social figures, dignitaries, and civilians from the Bani Maudhah, Bani al-Shurayfi, and the Bani Rassam, all of whom are from Mikhlaf Himyar in

the middle of the Utmah district in the Dhamar governorate

Third parties Page 1, This truce was written under the knowledge of:

General Ismael al-Samawi

[Signed]

Judge Hamoud bin Abdulhameed al-Hitar

Description Truce agreement to last for 6 months between three tribes in the Utmah District of

Dhammar Governorate. Agreement appears to be mediated by a judge and signed by the mediator and a general on behalf of the conflict parties. Truce is to extent to public and

private venues and beyond the borders of Yemen to include individuals abroad.

Enforcement mechanism is a four-fold retribution on anyone that violates the agreement

undertaken by those calling for the truce and the guarantors.

Agreement YE_140120_Agreement between Bani al-Shurayfi and Bani Rassam in Utmah,

document Dhamar_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Agreement YE_140120_Agreement between Bani al-Shurayfi and Bani Rassam in Utmah,

document (original Dhammar_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)

language)

Local agreement properties

Formal structured process **Process type**

Rationale

This inter-tribal agreement appears to follow established processes regarding representation and enforcement and is supported by a judge and a general. The judge appears to be making supportive statements in the media, where the general appears to be affiliated with local security forces and could be viewed as a type of guarantor. The agreement reflects a broader practice at the time of tribal agreements which are underpinned by mutual understandings around respect and social or cultural values. Parties themselves are both the actors who appear to enforce the agreement and ensure punishment of those who violate it. These practices are often tied in with some form of pledged support from local security actors, who they are truly affiliated with however is not always clear. In this example, it is also worth noting that many of the examples around the same time are agreements between tribes and Ansar Allah (Houthis). In this sense, tribes may enter an agreement or carry out a practice throughout a process differently when entering agreements with each other as opposed to with the Houthis or terrorist organisations.

Is there a Yes documented link to a national peace process?

Link to national rationale

[Summary] Agreement on Ministry of Justice letterhead and signed by a judge and a process: articulated general on behalf of the three tribes to which the agreement pertains. It does not seem the letter heading can infer a link, there is no clarity or evidence on how the piece of paper was procured or circulated. As this is within a complex conflict and on the basis of involvement by local governance actors or state representatives, it could be possible to consider the involvement of the Judge as a link to the national process as he is playing a form of mediatory role.

Name of Locale Dhammar governorate

Nature of Locale Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 14.501454, 44.016026

Participant type Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder

Mediator, facilitator Mediator or similar referred to or similar

Mediator (references)

Page 1, 2. ... The signatures of the parties to the truce and their guarantors are included below in agreement for what is written in this agreement, and Allah is the arbiter of success and guidance. This truce was written under the knowledge of: General Ismael al-Samawi Judge Hamoud bin Abdulhameed al-Hitar [Signed] Additionally, the source implied the Judge was playing the role of a mediator, leading the effort and providing official statements in the media. The General appears as a guarantor and it seems is representing local security forces. Guarantors from both sides are also referenced in the provisions as sources of enforcement, regarding punishment of those who violate the agreement.

Type of mediator/ facilitator/similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)

Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Page 1, The signatures of the parties to the truce and their guarantors are included below in agreement for what is written in this agreement, and Allah is the arbiter of success and

guidance.

Grievance List [Summary] (1) End all conflict and inter-tribal feuds in the affected areas and demobilise

arms and fighters (2) Disassemble military installations from all areas of fighting (3)

return of displaced people to their homes (4)

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.