

<b>Country/entity</b>	Yemen
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	United Nations Initiative for a Two-Month Truce
<b>Date</b>	2 Apr 2022
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Government/territory
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen peace process
<b>Parties</b>	Copy of agreement unsigned, parties are understood as: Saudi Arabia and the Coalition Ansar Allah (Houthis)
<b>Third parties</b>	Copy of agreement unsigned, third party understood as: United Nations (OESGY)
<b>Description</b>	A short two month ceasefire agreement during Ramadan between the conflict parties in Yemen calling for general conditions of ceasefire halting all offensive operations on the ground, in the air and by sea. The agreement provides for entry of supplies into the country including fuel by sea, commercial flights and opening up of roads. The agreement also makes the parties responsible for the modalities and timings of the truce, establishing the need for parties to inform affiliated fighting forces and put in place points of contact who should work with OESGY to implement the agreement. On June 2nd 2022, the truce was extended for an additional two-month period, though no text of the extension has been made available.

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<b>Agreement document</b>	<a href="#">YE_220402_United_Nations_Initiative_for_a_two-month_truce.pdf (opens in new tab)</a>   <a href="#">Download PDF</a>
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## Women, girls and gender

**Participation** No specific mention.

**Equality** No specific mention.

**Particular groups of women** No specific mention.

**International law** No specific mention.

**New institutions** No specific mention.

**Violence against women** No specific mention.

**Transitional justice** No specific mention.

**Institutional reform** No specific mention.

<b>Development</b>	<p>Development→General</p> <p>Page 1,</p> <p>Truce will comprise the following elements:...</p> <p>4. Once the Truce comes into effect, the SE will invite the parties to a meeting to agree on opening roads in Taiz and other governorates to facilitate the movement of civilian men, women and children, benefiting from the atmosphere of the Truce.</p>
<b>Implementation</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Other</b>	No specific mention.

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