Country/entity
Chad
Sudan
Region
Africa (excl MENA)
Agreement name
Doha Agreement
Date
03/05/2009
Agreement status
Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement
No
Agreement/conflict level
Interstate/intrastate conflict(s) (Chadian Conflicts (1966 - )
The political history of Chad has been defined by ethno-religious conflict following independence from France in 1960, particularly between the Islamic north and the Christian and animist south. Although prevalent during the colonial era, this became particularly apparent under Tombalbaye during his 15-year rule (1960-1975), which saw mass discrimination against the Muslim northern and central regions. In 1966, the Islamist National Liberation Front on Chad (FROLINAT) was formed, but the movement was defined by factionalism and in-fighting, often encouraged by Libyan government policies, until the civil war ended in 1993. In 1975 Tombalbaye was killed during a coup, and the country reverted to military rule. Constant pressure from the various FROLINAT factions, however, caused then-ruler General Felix Malloum to align himself with Hissene Habre, a rebel leader formerly-aligned with FROLINAT, but then-commander of the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN). In 1978, Libyan troops also occupied the Aouzou Strip (See Libyan-Chadian Conflict). Meanwhile, Habre’s FROLINAT competitor, Goukouni Oueddei, gathered the majority of the northern insurgent factions, and the ensuing civil war between 11 factions eroded the capabilities of the state. In 1979, the Lagos Accords created a unity government (GUNT) that briefly convened the factions, but infighting between Habre and Goukouni’s forces broke out soon after.

Habre finally gained control of N’Djamena in 1982, but faced continuing insurgent pressure from GUNT. This changed in the mid-1980s when all forces in Chad aligned themselves against the Libyan occupation and expelled them from Chad. Infighting in Habre’s regime, meanwhile, saw the defection of General Idriss Deby to Sudan, where he launched a Zaghawa campaign against the President and took the capital in December 1990 with Libyan-backing. Deby was announced President in early 1991, and to ease fighting he announced elections, which he won, in 1996. A number of short-lived peace deals were signed with several rebel factions in 1997, but fighting continued. In 2003, an influx of over 200,000 refugees from Darfur complicated the matter further, and in 2005 Chad declared war on Sudan, which was backing the Chadian rebel group, Rally for Democracy and Liberty. A series of battles ensued across Chad culminating in the Battle of N’Djamena in 2008. The latest war ended in 2010 with a peace accord signed between Sudan and Chad.

In 2021, the FACT (Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad: Front for Change and Concord in Chad) attacked the Chadian military on the eve of presidential elections. President Idriss Déby was killed in the attack, and the army formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC).
Chadian Conflicts (1966 - ) and Sudan Conflicts (1955 - )
Agreements relate to several distinct dyads, and also the negotiated independence of South Sudan, and subsequent internal conflict in South Sudan. Sudan-South Sudan. The long-standing conflict between the north and the south of the country dates back to colonial times, where the British introduced a so-called ‘Southern Policy’, severely hampering population movements between these big regions. Immediately after gaining independence in 1956, southern movements started to fight for independence; this fight became professionalised in 1983 with the foundation of the soon internationally supported Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). When the Islamic Front government introduced strict sharia laws in the south after it took over power in 1988 the war intensified. A decade later, the military situation reached a stalemate, enabling internationally facilitated peace negotiations to begin in 1997. After more fighting, a final negotiation push began in 2002, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Areement (CPA) in January 2005.

Sudan-South Sudan post referendum. South Sudan became independent in July 2011; since then, relations between the two countries are complicated and violent conflict led by the SPLM (North) in the Sudanese Nuba mountains region has since intensified.

Darfur. Other long-standing violent conflicts are in the east and the west of the country. In the east, the Beja Congress, established in 1957, is the spearhead of a currently ‘peaceful’ opposition movement. In the west, the violent conflict in Darfur intensified in the early 2000s and rapidly gained international attention, even resulting in genocide charges against leading figures of the Sudanese government. The situation on the ground is complex, with over a dozen organisations (most notably the Sudanese Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement) fighting the Sudanese government and allied groups like the Janjaweed – although all parties have switched sides on numerous occasions. Several mediation attempts have not been successful, due to the shaky commitment of the Sudanese central government and the distrust among the armed opposition.

South Sudan - internal
In December 2013, after president Salva Kiir accused opposition leader Riek Machar of attempting a coup, violent conflict broke out between government forces of the SPLM/A and anti-governmental groups. In addition, several other political militias as well as communal militias have joined the conflict. In 2015 the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed. Due to unsuccessful implementation the agreement was revitalized in 2018. In September 2019, Kiir and Machar agreed to establish a power-sharing government after struggles on forming a unity transitional government.
Sudan Conflicts (1955 - ) )
Stage
Implementation/renegotiation (Implementation modalities)
Conflict nature
Territory
Peace process
134: Chad-Sudan Agreements
Parties
Moussa Faki Mahamat, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chad; Al-Tijani Salih Fidail, Minister for International Cooperation of the Republic of the Sudan
Third parties
[Agreement does not indicate role of Third Parties, however text does indicate 'Thanks to the efforts of [...]'; 'With the participation of [...]'; 'thanks for the efforts of the State of Qatar in hosting this meeting'] Musa M. Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 'and Chairperson of the African Union'; Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Council of Ministers of the State of Qatar
Description
An agreement that pledges to implement the previously negotiated agreements between the two States, with the parties reaffirming their determination to not interfere in the internal affairs of the other State, to cease hostile media campaigns against the other, to refrain from use of force, and to not support hostile, armed elements in either State. The Parties also invite the State of Qatar to the contact group, and request an urgent plan for joint protection forces and monitoring mechanisms.

Agreement document
SD_TD_090503_DohaAgreement.pdf []

Groups

Children/youth
No specific mention.
Disabled persons
No specific mention.
Elderly/age
No specific mention.
Migrant workers
No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/national group
No specific mention.
Religious groups
No specific mention.
Indigenous people
No specific mention.
Other groups
No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons
No specific mention.
Social class
No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender
No specific mention.
Men and boys
No specific mention.
LGBTI
No specific mention.
Family
No specific mention.

State definition

State definition
Cross-border provision
Page 2, The Doha Agreement
Thanks to the efforts of [...] aimed at:
– Normalizing relations between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan and strengthening brotherly relations between them;
– Implementing all provisions of the agreements concluded between the countries, in particular the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006, the Khartoum Framework Agreement and its additional protocols of 28 August 2006, the Riyadh Agreement of 3 May 2007 and the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008;
– Creating a climate of trust and the proper conditions for the holding of a summit in Tripoli, Libya, between the Presidents of the two countries.

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
1. The parties pledge to hasten the implementation of the aforementioned agreements in order to re-establish a climate of trust and good-neighbourliness between them;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
2. The parties reaffirm their determination not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs and to refrain from supporting any armed group that is hostile to the other party. They shall also strive to implement fully the aforementioned agreements concluded between the parties, as well as those to which they were witnesses or guarantors;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
3. The parties pledge to refrain from using force or threatening the use of force against one another;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
4. The parties pledge to revitalize their diplomatic relations so as to serve the interests of their brotherly peoples;

Page 3, The Doha Agreement
6. The parties affirm their commitment to end hostile media campaigns and encourage a positive media discourse that leads to the strengthening of brotherly ties and harmony;

Page 3, The Doha Agreement
The parties expressed their appreciation for the efforts of His Majesty Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani and Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi and for their roles in the efforts aimed normalizing relations between the brotherly countries.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed)
No specific mention.
Constitution's affirmation/renewal
No specific mention.
Constitutional reform/making
No specific mention.
Elections
No specific mention.
Electoral commission
No specific mention.
Political parties reform
No specific mention.
Civil society
No specific mention.
Traditional/religious leaders
No specific mention.
Public administration
No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing
No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing
No specific mention.
Economic power sharing
No specific mention.
Military power sharing
No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL
No specific mention.
Equality
No specific mention.
Democracy
No specific mention.
Protection measures
No specific mention.
Human rights framework
No specific mention.
Civil and political rights
No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights
No specific mention.
NHRI
No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions
No specific mention.
Mobility/access
No specific mention.
Detention procedures
No specific mention.
Media and communication
Media roles
Page 3, The Doha Agreement
6. The parties affirm their commitment to end hostile media campaigns and encourage a positive media discourse that leads to the strengthening of brotherly ties and harmony;
Citizenship
No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law
No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions
No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts
No specific mention.
Prisons and detention
No specific mention.
Traditional Laws
No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction
No specific mention.
National economic plan
No specific mention.
Natural resources
No specific mention.
International funds
No specific mention.
Business
No specific mention.
Taxation
No specific mention.
Banks
No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights
No specific mention.
Pastoralist/nomadism rights
No specific mention.
Cultural heritage
No specific mention.
Environment
No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access
No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees
Page 2, The Doha Agreement
2. The parties reaffirm their determination not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs and to refrain from supporting any armed group that is hostile to the other party. They shall also strive to implement fully the aforementioned agreements concluded between the parties, as well as those to which they were witnesses or guarantors;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
3. The parties pledge to refrain from using force or threatening the use of force against one another;

Page 3, The Doha Agreement
5. The parties request the contact group established pursuant to the Dakar Agreement should convene urgently in order to adopt and implement a plan of action to complete immediately the deployment of monitors and joint protection forces. The parties recommend the addition of the State of Qatar to the contact group, because of its effective efforts aimed at achieving peace in the region, and the establishment, if needed, of new observation posts by both parties. They also recommend that the States supporting the present Agreement should strive urgently to provide the financial and logistical support required for the deployment of the monitors and protection forces for a period of one year, with the possibility of an extension, should that be required;
Ceasefire
No specific mention.
Police
No specific mention.
Armed forces
No specific mention.
DDR
No specific mention.
Intelligence services
No specific mention.
Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces
No specific mention.
Withdrawal of foreign forces
Page 2, The Doha Agreement
2. The parties reaffirm their determination not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs and to refrain from supporting any armed group that is hostile to the other party. They shall also strive to implement fully the aforementioned agreements concluded between the parties, as well as those to which they were witnesses or guarantors;
Corruption
No specific mention.
Crime/organised crime
No specific mention.
Drugs
No specific mention.
Terrorism
No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice general
No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon
No specific mention.
Courts
No specific mention.
Mechanism
No specific mention.
Prisoner release
No specific mention.
Vetting
No specific mention.
Victims
No specific mention.
Missing persons
No specific mention.
Reparations
No specific mention.
Reconciliation
No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory
No specific mention.
Other international signatory
[Agreement does not indicate role of Third Parties, however text does indicate 'Thanks to the efforts of [...]' and 'With the participation of [...]'] Musa M. Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 'and Chairperson of the African Union'; Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Council of Ministers of the State of Qatar
Referendum for agreement
No specific mention.
International mission/force/similar
Page 3, The Doha Agreement
5. The parties request the contact group established pursuant to the Dakar Agreement should convene urgently in order to adopt and implement a plan of action to complete immediately the deployment of monitors and joint protection forces. The parties recommend the addition of the State of Qatar to the contact group, because of its effective efforts aimed at achieving peace in the region, and the establishment, if needed, of new observation posts by both parties. They also recommend that the States supporting the present Agreement should strive urgently to provide the financial and logistical support required for the deployment of the monitors and protection forces for a period of one year, with the possibility of an extension, should that be required;
Enforcement mechanism
Page 2, The Doha Agreement
Thanks to the efforts of [...] aimed at:
– Normalizing relations between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan and strengthening brotherly relations between them;
– Implementing all provisions of the agreements concluded between the countries, in particular the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006, the Khartoum Framework Agreement and its additional protocols of 28 August 2006, the Riyadh Agreement of 3 May 2007 and the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
1. The parties pledge to hasten the implementation of the aforementioned agreements in order to re-establish a climate of trust and good-neighbourliness between them;

Page 2, The Doha Agreement
2. The parties reaffirm their determination not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs and to refrain from supporting any armed group that is hostile to the other party. They shall also strive to implement fully the aforementioned agreements concluded between the parties, as well as those to which they were witnesses or guarantors;

Page 3, The Doha Agreement
8. The parties shall submit any dispute concerning the interpretation of provisions of the present Agreement to arbitration with a view to its resolution;

The University of Edinburgh